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Abstract
This paper adopts a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium-vector au-
torgressive (DSGE-VAR) approach to examine the managed exchange-
rate system at work in Singapore. We examine if the country has any
reason to fear oating the exchange rate and adopting a Taylor rule. Our
results show that, in terms of overall ination volatility, the exchange
rate rule has a comparative advantage over the Taylor rule when export-
price shocks are the major sources of real volatility, while a Taylor rule
dominates when domestic productivity shocks drive real volatility. The
exchange-rate rule also dominates the Taylor rule for reducing ination
persistence.
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1 Introduction
Should Singapore fear oating its exchange rate by adopting a Taylor rule? 1
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) noted that many emerging markets retain a prefer-
ence for a managed oat with much less exibility than is commonly assumed
by o¢ cial exchange-rate classication schemes. Lack of credibility of the mone-
tary authority or liability dollarization, they note, are major reasons emerging
market countries would avoid oating and adopting a Taylor rule. However,
there are other reasons which may be more relevant for a small, highly open
and fast growing economy such as Singapore.
Reecting the small open nature of its economy, Singapore has adopted in
1981 (e¤ectively, but not o¢ cially) an ination-targeting exchange rate centered
monetary policy framework.2 Given the open-economy trilemma, monetary
policy can only achieve two of the following three dimensions: monetary policy
independence, xed exchange rates, and open capital accounts. As a major
nancial centre, Singapore has chosen free capital mobility. Hence, it can only
choose to target either the exchange rate or some other monetary variable, but
not both. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has chosen to use the
exchange rate as opposed to the more conventional benchmark policy interest
rate as its policy operating tool since the early 1980s (MAS, 2000).
This is not surprising as the highly open and trade-dependent nature of the
economy suggest that the exchange rate could be an e¤ective tool for managing
the state of the economy. Singapore is highly dependent on external demand
which constitutes about seventy percent of aggregate demand. Moreover, do-
mestic consumption has a high import content  out of every Singapore dollar
spent domestically, about fty cents are applied to imports. Being a price-taker
in international markets, it is logical to assume that Singapore is highly suscep-
tible to imported ination. It would appear that Singapore has been well served
by an uno¢ cial "ination-targeting" managed exchange rate-centered monetary
policy framework with free capital mobility and with the domestic short-term
interest rates determined by foreign interest rates, allowing for a time-varying
risk premium.
Managing the exchange rate comes with a cost, namely, the fear of specu-
lative attacks. With the exception of the Asian crisis period in 1997, the MAS
has successfully deterred speculators from attacking the domestic currency over
the past three decades. But it has been argued that it is the exibility accorded
by the managed exchange rate system that aided Singapore in escaping from
the Asian crisis relatively unscathed. Singapores acceptance of market driven
depreciations in the wake of and amid the deepening of the Asian nancial crisis
deterred currency speculators from engineering over-depreciation in the domes-
tic currency (Yip, 2005). In other words, it is as if the Singapore dollar was on
a free oat during this period.3
1The interest-rate feedback rule for ination targeting was extensived analyzed by Taylor
(1993) and is commonly known as the Taylor rule.
2 In practice, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) adopts an intermediate exchange
rate regime by targeting the Singapore dollar under a basket-band-crawl (BBC) system (Khor
et al, 2004; Williamson, 1999). Under this managed oat system, the Singapore dollar is
related to a trade-weighted basket (termed TWI) of currencies of its major trading partners
and competitors. Neither the component currencies, their assigned weights in the basket, the
central rate, nor the band limits are disclosed by the MAS.
3Of course, Singapores substantial amount of foreign reserves played a critical role in de-
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The Asian nancial crisis raised awareness that pegged exchange rates and its
attendant insurance e¤ect exacerbated boom-bust cycles associated with capital
ows, thereby contributing to the crisis (Cossetti et al., 1999). This prompted
many central banks in East Asia to shift their focus from exchange rate stabil-
ity to price stability. In particular, crisis-hit countries like Indonesia, (South)
Korea, Philippines and Thailand announced the explicit adoption of ination
targeting and the move towards using interest rates as the key monetary policy
instrument. However, unless capital controls are imposed, the open economy
trilemma dictates that countries that adopt ination targeting should necessar-
ily have a freely oating exchange rate regime as well. Should Singapore follow
suit?4
The MASstated objective for monetary policy is "to ensure low ination as
a sound basis for sustained economic growth". In practice, then, the exchange
rate became the policy instrument to stabilize ination and output around their
desired target levels while the interest rate was e¤ectively tied to the foreign
rate. An alternative set-up is to use the interest rate as the policy instrument,
while the exchange rate adjust to market forces. Should Singapore oat its
currency and adopt a Taylor rule?
To determine if the conduct of monetary policy would have been more welfare
enhancing had the interest rate been used as the policy operating instrument in
place of the exchange rate requires counter-factual experiments and simulation
analysis. This is the purpose of this paper.
In a VAR analysis of Singapores monetary transmission mechanism, Chow
(2005) found that the exchange rate was more inuential than the interest rate
as a source of macroeconomic uctuations. However, the VAR methodology
cannot be used to address the question of "what if" had Singapore adopted
an alternative policy rule. This has to be examined in a framework where the
estimated parameters are not intrinsically linked to the historical policy settings
- the so-called Lucas critique of policy analysis. Hence the framework adopted
in this paper, belongs to the class of models called dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) or New Keynesian models of the small open economy.
In the next section we lay out a DSGE model of the Singapore economy with
its current exchange-rate regime and with nominal and real frictions in the form
of sticky wages and prices, habit persistence in consumption, and adjustment
costs for investment. We then discuss the results of a Bayesian estimation of
the model. Finally we undertake counterfactual simulations assuming a oating
exchange rate system with a Taylor rule for the interest rate and perform welfare
comparisons under the two monetary regimes. The last section concludes.
terring speculative attacks. Further, strong economic fundamentals such as consistent scal
surplus, large current account surplus, maintenance of stable and consistent macroeconomic
policies, and a robust nancial system are important explanations why Singapore was rela-
tively less a¤ected by the Asian crisis.
4Some market participants have advocated a move to greater exibility in the exchange
rate to guard against the risk of policymakers misjudging the level of Singapores equilibrium
exchange rate. However, others have pointed out that increasing exibility in the TWI would
increase the risk of the Singapore dollar overshooting and is thus, destabilizing.
3
2 Model
We model the Singapore macro economy as the aggregate outcome of the in-
teractions of four sectors. The household sector provides labour services, owns
the capital stock, makes consumption and investment decisions, and holds do-
mestic and foreign bonds. In supplying labor to the rms, the household sets
its wage in a monopolistically competitive fashion. All nancial interactions
are subsumed into this sector. The production sector is mainly responsible for
combining capital and labour to produce the goods. It sets the prices of domes-
tic goods in a monopolisticlaly competitive way. The government sector buys
domestic goods and services while collecting lump sum taxes from households,
and implements the policies under consideration, namely exchange-rate man-
agement. The fourth sector is the external sector. Singapore is a small open
economy and takes world prices and interest rates as given.
The equations of the model are standard in the literature, and we have
focussed on behavior which capture the key features of the Singapore economy,
namely its high degree of openness. We allow real-sector frictions, in the form
of habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. There
are two forms of nominal stickiness, one in wage setting and the other in the
setting of domestic nal-goods prices.
2.1 Household sector
The intertemporal welfare (V ) and utility function (U) for the household sector
are:5
V = E0
1X
t=0
tUt(Ct; Lt)
Ut(:) =
(Ct   cCt 1)1 
1     
L1+$t
1 +$
(1)
where  is the discount factor, C is consumption with habit persistence para-
meter c, L is labour services,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, $ is
the Frisch labour supply elasticity, and  is the disutility of labour. We assume
that the habit process is an external one, so that the habit stock at time t + i
is based on the average past periods consumption, cCt+i 1; The symbol E0
is the expectations operator at time t = 0:
The household budget equation can be written as:
WtLt+R
k
tKt+ t+Tt+Rt 1Bt 1+(R

t 1+Ht 1)StB

t 1 = Bt+StB

t+P
c
t Ct+P
i
t It
(2)
where W is the wage rate, Rk is the nominal rental rate on capital K,   is
distributed prots, T is taxes and transfers; B (B) are domestic (foreign)
bonds while R (R) are the gross interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds
with S as the exchange rate expressed as domestic to foreign currency and H
is a risk premium. The price index of consumption is given by P c, and for
investment goods by P i. The nancial assets are state-contingent with one
5Since the relationships between the micro (many households, di¤erentiated labour, and
monopolistic competition) and their macro (aggregate) counterparts are well-known, we have
only presented the aggregate equations here.
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period maturity. Following Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006), we assume that
capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kt =
"
It
Kt 1
  
2

It
Kt 1
  
2#
Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 (3)
where  is the depreciation rate and  is an adjustment cost factor,  > 0:
The household purchases consumption Ct and investment goods It;as well
as goverhment and foreign bonds and pays lump sum taxes, Tt: It rents capital
and supplies labor to rms, and receives wage income WtLt and rental income
from capital, RktKt:
The household sector takes P i; P c;W;Rk; R;R; and S as given and the
paths for consumption (C), capital (K), domestic (B) and foreign (B) bond
holdings are obtained by solving the Lagrangean problem (maximize present
value of utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the law of motion
for capital (3)). This yields the Euler equations below:
(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct
= 
(Ct+1   cCt) 
P ct+1
Rt (4)
RtSt = (R

t +Ht)St+1 (5)
Qt

1  

It
Kt 1
  

=

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

P it (6)
Qt =

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

Rkt
+Qt+1
"

2

I2t+1
K2t

 2 2 + (1  )
#
(7)
Household expenditures are for consumption (C) or for investment (I) at
respective prices P c; P i: Consumption and investment goods are mainly, but
not totally, imported and they are modeled respectively as CES functions:
Ct =
h
(1  c)1=c
 
Cdt
(c 1)=c + 1=cc (Cmt )(c 1)=cic=(1 c) (8)
Cdt = (1  c)

P dt
P ct
 c
Ct (9)
Cmt = c

Pmt
P ct
 c
Ct (10)
P ct =
h
(1  c)
 
P dt
1 c + c (Pmt )1 ci1=(1 c) (11)
It =
h
(1  i)1=i
 
Idt
(i 1)=i + 1=ii (Imt )(i 1)=iii=(1 i) (12)
Idt = (1  i)

P dt
P it
 i
It (13)
Imt = i

Pmt
P it
 i
It (14)
P it =
h
(1  i)
 
P dt
1 i + i (Pmt )1 ii1=(1 i) (15)
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where c, i are the respective share parameters and c; i represent the in-
tratemporal elasticities of substitution for consumption and investment.. The
world price for the imported consumption and investment goods are highly cor-
related and we have represented this as Pm:
The Singaporean labour market does not clear, and wages are modeled as
staggered contracts with a fraction (1   w) renegotiated each period. Each
household chooses the optimal wageW ot by maximizing the expected discounted
utility subject to the demand for its labor Lht =

W ot
Wt
 w
Lt where w is a
parameter governing the degree of substitution. This behavior is modeled in a
similar manner to the Calvo sticky prices and the model is written in recursive
form as:
Wnumt = (Wt)
w+w$
 
L1+$t

+ w:W
num
t+1 (16)
W dent =

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

(Wt)

Lt + w:W
den
t+1 (17)
(W ot )
1+w$ =
Wnumt
W dent
(18)
Wt =
h
w (Wt 1)
1 w + (1  w)(W ot )1 w
i 1
1 w (19)
where, Wnumt and W
den
t are auxiliary variables in the formula.
2.2 Production sector
Aggregate demand (Yt) comes from domestic consumption, government spend-
ing (G), exports (X) and investment:6
Yt = C
d
t +Gt +Xt + I
d
t (20)
Aggregate supply is a function of capital and labor:
Yt = K

t (ZtLt)
1  (21)
log(Zt) = log(Zt 1) + zt ; 
z
t  N(0; 2z) (22)
where Zt is an economy-wide unit-root technology shock and  is a parameter
that determines the degree of capital intensity for production. The prots of the
rms are given by the following relationships, and distributed to the households:
 t = PtYt  WtLt  RktKt
Maximizing prots also implies the following relationship:
Wt
(1  )Rkt
=
Kt
Lt
(23)
6To simplify the analysis, we assume that output is transformed into goods for di¤erent
end-users and that the markets are segmented.
6
We assume sticky monopolistically competitive rms and they set the price
for goods sold both domestically and in foreign markets. According to the
Calvo price setting world, there are forward-looking price setters and backward
looking setters. Assuming at time t that p is the probability of persistence,
with demand for the product from rm j given by Yt

P jt =Pt
 p
, the optimal
price, P ot can be written in recursive formulation as follows:
7
At =
 
Rkt

W 1 t
Zt
 
1
()

(1  )1 
!
(24)
P ot =
Pnumt
P dent
(25)
Pnumt = Yt (Pt)
p At + pP
num
t+1 (26)
P dent = Yt (Pt)
p + pP
den
t+1 (27)
Pt =
h
p (Pt 1)
1 p + (1  p) (P ot )1 p
i 1
1 p (28)
where A is the marginal cost and p is a substitution parameter.
2.3 Government Sector
The Treasury/Central Bank receives taxes and borrows to nance government
expenditure. The evolution of the domestic debt is:8
Bt = P
d
t Gt +Bt 1Rt 1 + Tt (29)
where government spending Gt is assumed to follow a simple exogenous autore-
gressive process and include a normally distributed innovation g with variance
2g :
log(Gt) = 
g log(Gt 1) + (1  g) log(G) + gt ; gt  N(0; 2g) (30)
The aim of monetary policy is to manage the exchange rate to "target"
ination, that is the exchange rate is engineered to appreciate (-) to manage
domestic ination. Following McCallum (2006)9 , we model the behavior of the
Monetary Authority of Singapore as following an exchange rate rule:10
log(St+1=St) = 
s log(St=St 1)  (1  s) (log(ct+1=c));  > 0 (31)
7For more details of the derivation see for example, Walsh (2003), chapter 5: Money,
Output and Ination in the Short-run
8We assume that the exogenous taxes prohibit that debt from becoming non-stationary.
9We note that this specication does not include an output-gap term. This does not mean
that variations in growth are not considered, only that they are considered via their impact
on ination.
10 In its semiannual monetary policy cycle, the MAS would announce the exchange rate
policy stance through a Monetary Policy Statement. Apart from changes to the crawl in the
central parity, there could be a re-centering of the policy band. Another form of adjustment
is through changing the width of the band of uctuations. Essentially, the exchange rate is
used as an intermediate monetary policy instrument to achieve the primary objective of non-
inationary growth. In a sense, monetary policy is operated in Singapore as sort of a hybrid
between the BBC and ination targeting. In practice, an adjustable band is used to track the
movement of its instrument, while setting its instrument in a way to hit intermediate targets
as a means to control ination and achieve non-inationary growth (Khor et al. 2004). In this
way, the BBC system can be operated to achieve the same objectives as ination targeting.
7
The parameter s measures the persistence and  is a reaction coe¢ cient, spec-
ied so that the exchange rate appreciates when ination rises. The gross
ination is for the consumer price index, with ct+1 = P
c
t+1=P
c
t .
11
2.4 External Sector
Singapore is a very open economy and highly susceptible to international factors.
Since it is a very small open economy we have modeled the external forces as
autoregressive processes. The foreign interest rate R is assumed to follow the
following autoregressive process (in log terms):
log(Rt ) = 
r log(Rt 1) + (1  r) log(R) + rt rt ~N(0; 2r*) (32)
To ensure that the small open economy is closed, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) and allow the risk premium to react to the deviation of foreign
debt:
log(Ht) = 
h log(Ht 1) + (1  h)
 
H + ' log(Bt =Bt )

+ ht ; 
h
t  N(0; 2h)
(33)
with ' < 0; the greater the deviation of foreign assets from the steady-state
level, the lower the risk premium. Foreign assets evolve as follows:
P xt Xt   Pmt (Imt + Cmt ) = St(Bt  Bt 1(Rt 1 +Ht 1)) (34)
Pmt = StP
m
t (35)
P xt = StP
x
t (36)
and the feedback loop from debt to risk premium ensures that foreign debt
do not become indeterminate. Following evidence reported in Chew, Ouliaris
and Meng (2009), we assume full pass-through of exchange-rate changes to the
domestic prices of imported goods. The demand for export goods by trading
partners is modeled in a similar way to the Singaporean demand for imported
goods:
Xt = f

P xt
Pwt
 f
Y t (37)
where f represents the share of imported goods in the trading partnerstotal
expenditure, f is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for domestic and
imported components, Y t is a measure of the GDP of trading partners, and P
w
t
is the world price index, normalized to unity.
The Singapore economy is sensitive to world prices and world output. These
processes, namely the trading partnersGDP Y ; import prices Pm

t ; and export
11Note that the term (1  s) log(S) has been dropped because log(S) = 0.
8
prices P x

t are all modeled to follow an autoregressive stochastic process:
12
log(Y t ) = 
y log(Y t 1) + (1  y) log(Y

) + yt ; 
y
t  N(0; 2y)
(38)
log(Pmt ) = 
pm log(Pm

t 1) + (1  pm) log(Pm) + pmt ; mt ~N(0; 2pm)
(39)
log(P xt ) = 
px log(P xt 1) + (1  px) log(P x) + pxt ; xt  N(0; 2px)
(40)
In summary, the model contains 7 processes and a number of autoregres-
sive, reaction and deep parameters. We turn now to the estimation of the
log-linearised model.
2.5 Log-Linear Model
Following standard practice, the model described above is log-linearised. Then
since the original variables are non-stationary, we adopt the practice of trans-
forming the variables so that the estimated model contains stationary variables.
There are two types of manipulations; the rst is to detrend real variables by
productivity (eyt = log(Yt=Zt)) and the second is to recast price variables into
relative terms (that is, work with t = log(Pt=Pt 1)):
Another point to mention is the index of openness. Singapore is a very open
economy and based on equation (20), we obtain a price relationship:
Pt = P
d
t (1 ) + P xt  (41)
where  is a measure of the share of exports in economic activity (see Mona-
celli and Gali, 2005).13
3 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the model for seven stochastic shocks: for government spending,
foreign trading partnersweighted GDP, import and export price ination, for-
eign interest rates, the risk premium, and productivity. We use seven observ-
ables: government spending, weighted GDP of trading partners14 , import price
ination, the foreign interest rate, the risk premium (calculated as the domestic
interest di¤erential less the realized change in the exchange rate), domestic GDP
growth and ination. With the exception of the foreign interest rate (LIBOR)
and the risk premium, all of the observables are in log rst di¤erences. The
estimation is carried out for the sample period 1985.1-2009.4.
12 In the empirical section, we have also modelled these processes to allow for some cross-
e¤ects in a VAR framework. We nd that the cross-terms were not signicant.
13The coe¢ cient  drops out in the log-linear model, but an estimate can be derived from
the steady state conditions. The estimate is used in computing utility/welfare in the counter-
factual experiments.
14This series is constructed by Abeyshinghe and Forbes (2005) and the data source is
http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/esu/data.html. It is an export share weighted average of the
real GDPs of the following countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand,
Taiwan, USA and OECD as one group. To allow for changes in the country composition of
Singapore trade, the export shares are computed as 12-quarter moving average.
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The results are presented in the following sections. The estimated parame-
ters were based on two methodologies (the DSGE and the DSGE-VAR) as a
check for robustness of estimates. We examine the shocks, the impulse response
functions and the conditional variance decompositions. Using information from
the extracted implied shocks, we also interpret how they have contributed to
the changes in the growth of GDP and ination over the sample period.
3.1 Estimation: DSGE and DSGE/VAR
We estimate the model for Singapore in a pure DSGE framework as well as in
a DSGE/VAR framework, following Del Negro, Marco and Schorfheide (2004,
2010), Adjemian, Darracq and Moyen (2008), and An and Kang (2009). The
intuition for using the hybrid DSGE/VAR approach comes from recognizing
that a pure DSGE model could su¤er from specication errors, and that the
explanatory power of the model could be improved by the use of a non-structural
VAR model. The weight of the pure VAR, relative to the pure DSGE model,
is given by the ratio 1=(1 + ): If  = 0, the pure VAR model explains all the
variation in the data, and if  = 1; the pure DSGE explains the variation in
the data without any input from the VAR15 . The advantage of using the hybrid
DSGE/VAR Bayesian model is thus to provide a specication test of the DSGE
model relative to the widely used non-structural alternative, the VAR, with
0 <  <1 indicating the merit of the DSGE relative to the VAR.
Table 1: Marginal Likelihood
DSGE DSGE/VAR
    = 1:303
Laplace Approximation 2127.049 2185.322
Modied Harmonic Mean 2124.905 2182.981
Table 1 shows the relative t of the DSGE model to a VAR model. The best
t gives the median  = 1:303 by both the Laplace and Harmonic Mean measure-
ments of the Marginal Likelihood. We note, as expected, that the DSGE/VAR
has a higher marginal likelihood than the pure DSGE model. Given this result,
we make use of the DSGE/VAR parameters for more detailed model analysis.
15However, we also note that stimating a pure DSGE is not identical to estimation of a
DSGE/VAR with  =1; since the DSGE/VAR relies on a nite lag structure.
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3.2 Parameter and Volatility Estimates
All of the structural parameters (for example behavioural parameters ;$; dy-
namic parameters g; r; standard deviations of the shocks parameters 2z; 
2
g;
were estimated, except for the discount factor  which is calibrated for a steady-
state annual gross interest rate of 1.04.16 In the log-linearized model, we speci-
ed the steady-state share of consumption to GDP at 0.6, and the steady-state
share of government spending to GDP at 0.1. These ratios are the mean values
of actual data. The net export ratio is 0.3.
Table 2 shows the priors and the posterior estimates under the pure DSGE
and the DSGE/VAR framework for the median  = 1:303: The table contains
the median and mean values of the Bayesian estimates for 200,000 simulations
in four blocks. We also show the inmum and supremum of each estimate for a
95% condence interval.
The priors are those commonly used in Bayesian models. We follow closely
the specications of Teo (2009) who estimated a DSGE model for Taiwan. We
set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for investment and for foreign
demand, i and f at 1.5 but specied the intratemporal elasticity for con-
sumption, c at 5, following evidence for this parameter presented by Alolfson,
Laseen, Linde and Villani (2007). We set the prior for the adjustment cost
coe¢ cient for investment, , at 200, in order to ensure that the volatility of
investment matched the observed volatility in the data.
With respect to the di¤erences between the DSGE and DSGE/VAR esti-
mates, the parameters g, y for the autoregressive process for government
spending and foreign GDP growth show more persistence in the pure DSGE
than in the DSGE/VAR framework. For the remaining parameters, Table 2
shows that the 95% condence interval estimates for the DSGE and DSGE/VAR
frameworks have a considerable degree of overlap.
Another point to note is with respect to the degrees of price and wage stick-
iness. The Calvo price stickiness parameter estimate is much lower than those
commonly found in models of the US or UK, but its 95% condence interval is
within the corresponding condence interval for Taiwan [0.48 0.77], reported by
Teo (2009). It would appear, however that wages are a lot more exible than
prices in the Singapore economy. Reforms were implemented in the Singapore
labour market (around late 1980s) to promote a more exible wage system by
encouraging companies to pay both a base rate and a variable component linked
to productivity and protability.
Table 2 also contains the volatility estimates. We see that in general,
with the exception of px; the estimated volatilities are slightly lower in the
DSGE/VAR model than in the DSGE model.
16Since the model is in log-linear deviations, there is no need to calibrate the model for
parameters which a¤ect the steady state, as suggested by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2007). We also abstract from tax e¤ects because they are small and only a¤ect the bond
accummulation equation. The shares are sample averages.
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Table 2: Prior and Posterior Estimates
Coe¢ cient Estimates
P r io r s P o s t e r io r s P o s t e r io r s
D SG E D SG E /VA R
D is t M e a n S td .D e v . M e d ia n M e a n .0 2 5 .9 7 5 M ed ia n M e a n .0 2 5 .9 7 5
g B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .9 0 5 0 .9 0 2 0 .8 6 7 0 .9 3 7 0 .6 5 3 0 .6 4 9 0 .5 1 7 0 .7 7 7
y B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .8 9 9 0 .8 9 7 0 .8 6 0 0 .9 3 2 0 .7 3 5 0 .7 3 2 0 .6 2 7 0 .8 3 2
r B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .9 5 8 0 .9 5 6 0 .9 3 1 0 .9 8 5 0 .9 3 3 0 .9 2 7 0 .8 7 2 0 .9 7 4
px B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .9 4 8 0 .9 4 7 0 .9 2 4 0 .9 7 2 0 .8 4 9 0 .8 4 2 0 .7 4 9 0 .9 3 5
pm B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .2 1 1 0 .2 1 1 0 .0 9 5 0 .3 1 6 0 .1 9 9 0 .2 0 1 0 .0 6 7 0 .3 2 6
s B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .0 9 8 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 2 3 0 .1 8 0 0 .1 4 5 0 .1 5 8 0 .0 3 0 0 .2 8 2
h B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .4 2 2 0 .4 2 4 0 .2 7 8 0 .5 6 9 0 .2 5 1 0 .2 5 3 0 .0 8 8 0 .4 1 0
' B e t a 0 .0 1 0 0 .1 0 0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 3
c B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .4 8 7 0 .4 8 7 0 .4 0 6 0 .5 6 8 0 .4 9 7 0 .4 9 6 0 .4 1 3 0 .5 7 7
i B e t a 0 .8 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .8 0 3 0 .7 9 9 0 .7 0 9 0 .8 8 9 0 .7 9 7 0 .7 9 9 0 .7 2 1 0 .8 8 1
p B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .4 3 9 0 .4 4 1 0 .3 3 3 0 .5 4 5 0 .4 3 5 0 .4 3 5 0 .3 2 1 0 .5 5 4
w B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .2 9 0 0 .2 9 0 0 .1 9 1 0 .3 7 9 0 .2 4 4 0 .2 4 6 0 .1 6 3 0 .3 3 3
w N o rm a l 6 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 5 .6 5 9 5 .6 6 2 3 .9 2 0 7 .4 6 8 5 .6 0 0 5 .6 2 6 3 .8 6 9 7 .5 3 7
 N o rm a l 2 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 2 .6 7 7 2 .6 8 2 2 .3 9 5 2 .9 9 5 2 .5 8 2 2 .5 7 8 2 .2 5 5 2 .9 2 5
$ B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .1 4 5 0 .1 7 6 0 .0 1 9 0 .3 3 9 0 .1 6 4 0 .2 3 3 0 .0 0 9 0 .5 1 4
 B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .0 5 0 0 .4 1 6 0 .4 1 5 0 .3 4 0 0 .4 9 6 0 .4 4 4 0 .4 4 5 0 .3 6 2 0 .5 2 3
 N o rm a l 1 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 1 .5 4 1 1 .5 5 8 1 .1 9 5 1 .9 0 0 1 .7 2 6 1 .7 5 4 1 .2 7 7 2 .1 9 4
 B e t a 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 2 7 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 2 8
c N o rm a l 5 .0 0 0 0 .5 0 0 2 .2 8 6 2 .3 0 5 2 .0 1 2 2 .6 1 9 2 .3 0 4 2 .3 1 2 2 .0 6 1 2 .5 7 3
i N o rm a l 1 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 1 .2 4 7 1 .2 6 1 1 .0 0 4 1 .4 9 7 1 .2 5 4 1 .2 4 9 1 .0 1 7 1 .4 5 3
f N o rm a l 1 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 1 .3 8 8 1 .3 9 5 1 .1 6 5 1 .6 4 0 1 .3 2 1 1 .3 3 2 1 .0 6 9 1 .5 7 3
 N o rm a l 2 0 0 5 0 2 4 6 .0 5 7 2 4 5 .1 6 6 1 6 2 .1 3 8 3 2 4 .9 0 6 2 5 1 .3 8 7 2 5 1 .3 2 5 1 6 5 .7 0 9 3 3 7 .8 3 6
c B e t a 0 .5 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 .7 6 8 0 .7 5 6 0 .6 3 7 0 .8 8 7 0 .7 4 1 0 .7 3 6 0 .6 0 5 0 .8 6 9
 N o rm a l 0 .7 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 .6 9 5 0 .6 9 6 0 .6 6 3 0 .7 2 3 0 .6 9 8 0 .6 9 8 0 .6 6 3 0 .7 2 6
 U n i fo rm [0 5 ]     1 .3 0 4 1 .3 3 0 0 .9 9 6 1 .6 5 4
Volatility Estimates
P r io r s P o s t e r io r s P o s t e r io r s
D SG E D SG E /VA R
D is t M e a n S td .D e v . M e d ia n M e a n .0 2 5 .9 7 5 M ed ia n M e a n .0 2 5 .9 7 5
z In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5
g In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 2 5 0 .0 2 5 0 .0 2 2 0 .0 2 8 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 2 2
y

In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 5
r In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1
p
x
In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 3
p
m
In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 2 4 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 2 6 0 .0 1 8 0 .0 1 8 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 2 1
q In v .g am m a 0 .0 1 0 .5 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 1 7 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 4
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Figure 1: Smoothed Shocks from the DSGE/VAR Model
3.3 Estimated Shocks
Figure 1 pictures the smoothed shocks extracted from the estimation of the
DSGE/VAR model and they appear to conrm a priori perceptions. As reected
in the negative shocks in foreign GDP, the Singapore economy was hit by a
succession of external shocks from mid 1990s to early 2000. These include the
1996-97 downturn in the global electronics industry, the 1997-98 Asian nancial
crisis, the 2001 burst of information technology bubble and the 2003 outbreak of
the SARS respiratory disease. In response to the various episodes of economic
slowdown, the government introduced cost-cutting measures and bring forward
various social infrastructure projects. Hence, government shocks appears to be
a driver from mid 1990s until early 2000.
Export demand was on an uptrend from mid 2000s till the lead up to the
global nancial crisis, not least because of the growing importance of China
as a market for Singaporean goods as well as intensifying trade linkages in
the region through an expansion of cross border production networks. In fact,
changes in external demand accounted for approximately 75% of the changes
in Singapores real total demand during this period. This helps explain the
climb in export prices prior to 2008. Following the onset of the global nancial
crisis (accompanied by a huge drop in foreign GDP), the Singapore economy
experienced a sharp contraction with GDP growth plunging to -9.5% in the rst
quarter of 2009. The propensity to import goods for domestic production or
consumption in Singapore is also very high and estimated to be around 0.8.
Reecting the very high propensity to import, import prices collapsed following
the onset of the global nancial crisis.
As for the shocks to productivity, there is a noticeable surge prior to the lead
up of the global nancial crisis. This could be partly attributed to the inux
of foreign labour including high skilled ones into Singapore over that period.
For instance, permanent residents grew by 8.1% between 2004 and 2009 while
non-local workers make up 35% of the workforce by 2009.
With respect to the other shocks, the model shows the declines in world
interest rates after 2000 and again in 2008. There was a huge shock to the
risk premium in the mid 1980s as Singapore entered into a deep recession in
13
Figure 2: Impulse Response Paths for GDP and Ination
1985 caused by uncompetitive exports and high labour costs. Subsequently, the
uncertainty around late 1990s can be attributed to the onset of the 1997-98
Asian nancial crisis.
3.4 Impulse Response Paths
Figure 2 shows the response paths generated by shocks for GDP and ination.
The grey areas represent 95% uncertainty bands. The results are in keeping with
theoretical propositions. Productivity, government spending, and foreign GDP
unambigiously positively a¤ect GDP growth, while foreign interest rates and the
risk premium have negligible impact e¤ects (the condence bands include zero
even in the short run). An increase in export price ination has negative e¤ects
on GDP growth through the export demand channel while a positive shock to
import price ination results in a switch in demand to domestic products by
consumers.
For ination, we see that an increase in demand via either government spend-
ing or foreign GDP lead to higher ination. Import price ination, foreign in-
terest rates and the risk premium generate higher ination through the cost
channel. Since most of the ination in Singapore is imported, it is not surpris-
ing that higher ination would be positively related to higher foreign interest
rates, which in turn are related to higher world ination. An increase in export
price ination causes a fall in foreign demand, which leads to a fall in domestic
ination. Productivity shocks generate higher ination in this model because
the demand e¤ects dominate supply e¤ects.
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3.5 Conditional Variance Decomposition
Table 3 gives the conditional variance decomposition of GDP and ination for
the seven shocks of the model for horizons of one, four, eight, twelve, sixteen
and twenty quarters. The results show that export-price ination shocks domi-
nate the variability of GDP at all of the horizons, explaining about seventy-ve
percent of the total variation. The only other shocks that matter, in decreasing
order of importance, are import-price ination (a¤ecting the cost of investment
goods), productivity, and foreign GDP. Government spending and the risk pre-
mium have negligible e¤ects. For ination, productivity shocks matters the
most, with some contribution from import and export price ination and world
interest rate shocks.
Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Shock: 1 4 8 12 16 20
GDP
z 0.080 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.072
g 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
y

0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
r 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
px 0.773 0.734 0.737 0.738 0.738 0.738
pm 0.091 0.136 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134
h 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ination
z 0.811 0.775 0.756 0.745 0.739 0.736
g 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
y

0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
r 0.020 0.050 0.071 0.084 0.091 0.095
px 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.065
pm 0.100 0.107 0.104 0.103 0.102 0.102
h 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.6 Historical Shock Decomposition
To gauge the relative importance of each of the exogenous shocks for key endoge-
nous variables of the model, and when, during the sample periods, particular
shocks become more important we turn to the historical shock decomposition.
Figure 3 pictures the historical shock decomposition for GDP growth and
ination for specic periods. We rst focus on the historical decomposition of
output. As discussed earlier in section 3.1.3, Singapore went into deep recession
in 1985 as high wage costs eroded export competitiveness. This is reected in
the negative shocks from productivity and export prices at the beginning of
the sample period. The subsequent recovery was aided by a boost to external
demand, with foreign GDP playing an important positive role in the late 1980s,
as well as a rebound in export price. However, the role of foreign GDP turned
negative as the recession in the US and parts of Europe in the early 1990s
dampened growth in Singapore in that period. Meanwhile, the large import
price shocks in the early 1990s can be attributed to high oil prices precipitated
by the 1991 Gulf war.
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In the mid 1990s, the contribution of government spending increased as
the Singapore government responded to the economic downswing triggered by
the global electronics downturn. Towards the end of 1990s, there was a large
negative shock to foreign interest rate at the outbreak of the Asian nancial
crisis. The Singapore economy was hit by a close sequence of external shocks in
the early 2000s which prompted the government to implement counter-cyclical
measures and boost spending. Hence, both the foreign GDP and government
spending played important roles in this period. With the inux of skilled foreign
labour from mid 2000s up till the onset of the global nancial crisis, shocks to
productivity became more important after 2005. At the onset of the global -
nancial crisis, foreign interest rate, external demand and export prices collapsed.
The noticeable negative e¤ect of export price ination in 2008/09 stand out very
clearly, much more than import price ination. Overall, the role of the export
price ination shocks are more substantial than the contribution of shocks to
government spending, foreign GDP, and foreign interest rate. The contribution
of risk premium shocks to growth is of least importance.
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Figure 3: Historical Decomposition of GDP and Ination
With respect to ination, we see the strong contribution of productivity
driving ination after 2005. Due to the high import content in all expenditure
components, we expect imported ination to play an important role in Sin-
gapores ination. Similarly, the openness of the Singapore economy suggests
that external demand will contribute signicantly to Singapores aggregate de-
mand, which subsequently adds to domestic price pressures. However, the his-
torical decomposition shows that collapse of foreign GDP of trading partners,
and shocks emanating from import prices, especially in the early 1990s (after
the Gulf War), and in 2008, at the time of the nancial crisis, are of lesser
magnitudes. This is a reection of the central banks ability to maintain price
stability through the use of the exchange rate as a policy tool to target low
ination. Firstly, an exchange rate appreciation has a direct e¤ect on domestic
prices by lowering the prices of imported services as well as imported interme-
diate and nal products. Secondly, a reduction in aggregate demand caused by
an appreciation of the local currency, alleviates inationary pressures indirectly
through the easing of domestic costs such as wages. The central bank managed
the exchange rate in response to shocks to import price ination and external
demand conditions throughout the sample period.
4 Counterfactual Taylor Rule
A key consideration in the use of the interest rate variable in the conduct of
monetary policy is whether the Singapore economy is interest rate sensitive.
Singapores extensive network of international nancial and trade linkages with
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Figure 4: Interest Di¤erentials between Singaporian Dollar and LIBOR
the attendant huge and rapid capital ows and a very liberal policy towards
foreign direct investment could result in an economy that is not responsive to
interest rate changes.
Figure 4, which depicts the ex post three-month uncovered interest di¤eren-
tial between the LIBOR and Singapore, reveals that the di¤erentials are quite
di¤erent from zero. As pointed out by Yip (2003) they are substantially larger
in magnitude compared with corresponding gures from Hong Kong. Hence, the
uctuations in the di¤erentials suggest some scope for managing the domestic
interest rate, so that the MAS can exercise a degree of control over domestic
interest rates by varying the amount of liquidity injections.
It is natural to ask then, if Singapore would do better with an ination
targeting rule based on a Taylor rule? The typical formulation of the Taylor
rule has the interest rate as a function of its own lag, as well as a function of
ination from its target rate, and an output gap measure:
log(Rt) = 
r log(Rt 1) + (1  r)(log(ct=c)) (42)
+(1  r)y(log(Yt=Y flext ))
0  r  1;  > 1; y  0
where ct is the gross consumption price ination rate, c is the target (steady-
state) ination rate, Yt is GDP, Y
flex
t is the level of output in a exible wage
and price economy, while r is the smoothing coe¢ cient,  is the ination coef-
cient, y is the output gap coe¢ cient, with the gap dened as (log(Yt=Y
flex
t )):
Determinacy of ination requires that the ination rate coe¢ cient be great than
unity, hence  > 1:
Given that we acknowledge a certain degree of model misspecication, by
making use of the DSGE/VAR estimates of the model, further assumptions are
needed for counterfactual simulation. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2010) explore
two alternatives in the context of the DSGE/VAR framework. One is to assume
that the discrepancies between the DSGE and empirical VAR model are policy
invariant. The second is to take misspecication into account through draws
on the prior distributions of the parameters, conditional on the counterfactual
policy regime. Given that the DSGE and DSGE/VAR parameter condence
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intervals show a considerable degree of overlap, as noted in our discussion of
the results presented in Table 2, we assume that the relatively small degree of
misspecication is policy invariant.
Since the Taylor rule is the counterfactual, we obtain the coe¢ cient values
for this policy alternative from optimization of the welfare function, given by
equation (1), conditional on the parameters obtained from the DSGE/VAR
model. From numerical optimization of the model, the following estimates
emerge for the couterfactual optimal Taylor rule: br = 0:15; b = 1:025;by = 0:425:
We compare the performance of the model using the actual and counterfac-
tual optimal Taylor rule in three ways. First we examine the paths of ination
and the output gap over the estimation period, assuming that both regimes are
subjected to the same set of smoothed shocks. Second, we examine the impulse
response paths for ination and the output gap, for all of the shocks, under the
two regimes. Third, we examine the distributions of ination and output gap
volatility, over 1000 stochastic realizations, with the sample size equal to the
historical sample.
4.1 Comparisons
4.1.1 Historical and Counterfactual Simulations
Figures 5 and 6 picture the paths of ination and the output gap predicted by
the model when the smoothed shocks (for productivity, the world interest rate,
the risk premium, government spending, world GDP, and export and import
price ination) are used as the innovations in the model.
We see that the two paths are quite close. The standard deviation of ina-
tion in the counterfactual regime is higher than under the actual exchange rate
regime (0.089 vs 0.067), while the output gap volatilities are virtually the same
(0.025 in both regimes). Figure 5a shows that the drop in the output gap under
the counterfactual regime at the time of the Asian crisis is slightly less, but
following the world crisis of 2008, we see that the swings in the output gap are
of equal magnitude under both regimes. The reason is that the main cause of
the drop in demand is the collapse of foreign GDP, which neither the exchange
rate nor the domestic interest rate could stabilize in any way.
4.1.2 Impulse Response Paths
Figure 7 pictures the impulse response paths of ination and the output gap un-
der the actual and counterfactual policy regimes for the seven shocks estimated
for the model. While the paths are generally close, we see a number of di¤er-
ences in the initial response. In response to a productivity shock, ination rises
under the exchange-rate rule but falls under the Taylor rule. The reason for the
di¤erent response is that the productivity shock also increases the output gap.
Since the Taylor rule responds to the output gap, with an increase in the interest
rate, ination will fall following the productivity shocks in this regime. We also
see that ination is more responsive to an import-price ination shock under
the Taylor rule than the base regime. The reason is that in the base exchange
rate regime, ination targeting can diminish the e¤ects of import price ination
changes on domestic-currency prices more quickly than the interest rate rule,
since the exchange rate is a component of domestic ination..
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Figure 5: Output Gap under Actual and Counterfactual Policy Regimes
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Figure 6: Ination under Actual and Counterfactual Policy Regimes
20
Figure 7: Impulse Response Paths of Ination and Output Gap under Actual
and Counterfactual Policy Regimes
The impulse response analysis suggests that one rule may be more useful
than another for stabilizing ination, depending on the nature of the shocks
a¤ecting the economy. If productivity shocks dominate, the Taylor rule appears
to be more e¤ective, but if foreign price shocks dominate, the exchange-rate
rule is preferable. We discuss this in greater detail below, where we take up
the comparative advantage of the two instruments for productivity and foreign
ination shocks.
4.1.3 Stochastic Simulations
So far, we have examined the response of the model to the historical smoothed
shocks or to a one period shock, with all other innovations held at zero. For a
more complete picture, we examine the volatilities (based on second moments)
of ination and the output gap, as well as the two alternative policy instru-
ments, the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate and the interest rate, for
1000 stochastic simulations based on random draws of the shocks from their
underlying distributions. Each draw was the size of the historical sample.
Figure 8 pictures the distributions of the volatility measures. We see a clear
volatility trade-o¤ in the choice of policy instrument. Under the exchange-rate
rule, the depreciation is much less volatile and the interest rate more volatile,
than under an interest-rate based rule.
We see that there is a slight increase in the volatility of ination if the mon-
etary authority switches from an exchange-rate based ination targeting regime
to an interest-rate based regime, but since the policy is aimed at managing ina-
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Figure 8: Volatility Distributions of Ination, Output Gap, Depreciation and
the Interest Rate under Actual and Counterfactual Regimes
tion, the di¤erences will be small. What is surprising is the result for the output
gap - there is virtually no di¤erence between the volatilities under both regime
even though the comparison is between an estimated exchange rate depreciation
rule with an optimal Taylor rule.
To understand this result, we derived an optimal (welfare-maximing) depre-
ciation rule, given the shocks of the model, and we nd that the optimal rule
delivers an output gap coe¢ cient of zero, with a lower coe¢ cient on ination
(1.05) and a larger smoothing coe¢ cient on lagged depreciation (0.675) than the
corresponding estimated coe¢ cients of 1.72 and 0.145. In other words, the base
exchange rate rule is close to the optimal rule. Thus, the counterfactual Tay-
lor rule and the exchange-rate rule represent simple optimal rules, with nearly
identical results on the output gap.
To interpret the di¤erences in the welfare between the two regimes, we cal-
culate the implied habit-adjusted consumption compensation index required to
equalize the welfare of the representative household in the two regimes, following
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). A positive value implies that the household
in the counterfactual scenario is worse o¤ and needs a positive habit-adjusted
consumption compensation to have the same welfare as the household in the
base scenario. A negative value means that the household is better o¤ in the
counterfactual scenario, and would have to have consumption reduced to be
equal to the welfare realized in the base scenario.
The mean compensation from the stochastic simulations is -0.0025%, imply-
ing that the household is only very minimally worse o¤, a quarter of a percent
of a percent, of a unit of habit-adjusted consumption, under the base exchange
rate regime relative to the counterfactual Taylor rule.
4.2 A Comparative Advantage for Policy Regimes?
The analysis thus far show that the optimal (welfare-maximizing) Taylor rule,
based on the lagged interest rate, ination and the output gap, reduces ination
in the wake of a productivity shock, while the empirically-estimated exchange
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rate depreciation rule lowers ination in the wake of an export price shock. We
also see in Table 6 that real GDP volatility was largely explained by export-
price volatility (74 percent) relative to productivity (4 percent). For stabilizing
welfare, not just ination, it makes sense for the MAS to make use of the
exchange-rate depreciation rule rather than the Taylor rule, especially if export
price shocks dominate. If, however, GDP were driven much more by produc-
tivity relative to export price shocks, our analysis suggests that the Taylor rule
might make more sense as a policy regime.
To assess the relative performance or comparative advantage of the two
policy regimes, we simulated the estimated model with the two optimal rules,
for the case of pure export price shocks and for the case of pure productivity
shocks. The volatility measures for ination, output gap, and the two policy
instruments (the interest rate and exchange rate) are computed.
Table 4 shows the comparative advantage of the two policy regimes. We see
that the Taylor rule does a much better job in terms of ination volatility for
recurring productivity shocks. But, there is a volatility trade-o¤ with a switch
to an interest rate rule (compared to the exchange rate rule), in that ination
volatility falls but output-gap volatility increases. However, for recurring shocks
to export prices, we see that switching from a Taylor rule to a depreciation
rule reduces by almost half the volatility of ination, while the output-gap
volatility slightly falls. The overall results suggests that a policy regime based
on ination-targeting exchange-rate management has a decided comparative
advantage over the Taylor rule when the economy is subject to recurrent export
price shocks.
Table 4: Comparing Policy Regimes: Volatility
Shocks  log (Y=Y flex) r s
Exchange Rate Rule
z 0.0244 0.0011 0.0247 0.0246
px 0.0029 0.0177 0.0028 0.0028
Taylor Rule
z 0.0172 0.0144 0.0038 0.1214
px 0.0047 0.0179 0.0041 0.0161
Gerlach and Tillman (2012) have argued that policy regime changes should
also be evaluated on the basis of their e¤ect on ination persistence. They
found that Asian countries which have switched to an ination-targeting regime
(with a Taylor rule) have reduced ination persistence. What then are the
e¤ects of alternative "ination-targeting" regimes on ination persistence in
Singapore? Following Gerlach and Tillman, we use the following regression
equation to estimate the persistence coe¢ cient  :
t = t 1 +
kX
i=1
it i + "t
where t is ination, and "t is a normally-distributed innovation with variance
2":
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We rst estimate the persistence coe¢ cient  for the actual data, and obtain
a bootstrapped 95% condence interval. We then simulate the model (using
the estimated standard errors of all of the shocks), under the two policy regimes,
to nd the mean, median and condence intervals of ination persistence.
Table 5: Ination Persistenceb bmean bmedian b:025 b:975
Actual Ination 0.51 0.17 0.85
Exchange-Rate Rule 0.26 0.30 -0.40 0.71
Taylor Rule 0.85 0.94 0.12 1.06
Table 5 shows a condence interval of [0.17 0.85] for ination persistence
for actual observed data. Based on simulated data, the mean and median of
the persistence coe¢ cient for the exchange-rate rule lie at the lower end of the
actual distribution, while the mean and median under the Taylor-rule regime
lie at the upper end of the actual distribution. These results indicate that
the ination-targeting regime with the exchange-rate rule has a comparative
advantage over the Taylor rule ination-targeting regime for achieving lower
ination persistence.
5 Conclusion
This paper has laid out a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the
Singapore economy. We estimated the model with seven stochastic shocks
and seven observable variables. The shocks are to productivity, government
spending, foreign interest rates, foreign GDP, import and export price ination
and the risk premium. The observables used in the Bayesian estimation are
domestic GDP growth, CPI ination, government spending, foreign interest
rates, foreign GDP growth, import price ination and the risk premium. The
sample period is from 1985 to 2009.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) adopted an exchange-rate in-
strument to manage ination for this period. This paper shows that there is
no reason for Singapore to have any fear of oating. Given the structure of
the shocks impinging on the economy, welfare di¤erences would be very minor.
The only trade-o¤ would be in the volatility of the alternative policy instru-
ments. If the MAS abandoned the current exchange-rate rule, there would be
greater exchange-rate volatility and less interest-rate volatility, but not much
else would change. This result should not be surprising, since our Bayesian
estimates shows that the degree of price and wage exibility is relatively high
in comparison with most advanced economies. With high nominal exibility, it
should make little or no di¤erence which type of monetary regime is adopted.
However, this paper also shows that the choice of an exchange rate rule
makes eminent sense, when export price shocks dominate domestic productivity
shocks as the source of real sector volatility. The exchange-rate rule appears to
have a comparative advantage over the Taylor rule for stabilizing both ination
24
and the output gap in this situation. It also has a comparative advantage for
achieving lower ination persistence relative to a Taylor rule.
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